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We take pleasure in announcing that the note by Mr.
Henry P. Erdman, of the class of i9o7, on "Liability for
Injuries Done by Blasting without Proof of Negligence,"
which appeared in the last November issue of the REGISTER,
has been noticed in a recent decision of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota. It will be found cited in the case of Gould
v. Winona Gas Co., in the advance sheets of the North-

western Reporter.

FEDERAL TREATIES AND THE STATE POLICE PowER-A RBBUTTAL.-The side espoused by Dean Lewis of the Law Department of the University of Pennsylvania in his recent scholarlyarticle on the Japanese school question, can undoubtedly call
to its support adjudicated cases on the question of the right
s See AMERICAN LAw REGISTZR, VOl. 2,
REGISTER, vol. S4, No. 1a.
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of the Federal Government under its treaty-making pover
to interfere with the commercial and fiscal policy of a state.
It is believed however that the court in deciding these cases
did not consider or contemplate the questions which would
have been involved if the interference had been with mnatters
which were essentially personal and social.- There is no doubt
that the framers of the Constitution and the people who
adopted it intended to give to the central government large
if not exclusive commercial powers in so far as foreign nations
were concerned, and that they realized that in order that
such a grant of power might be effective it must at times
involve the right to interfere more or less with what may be
termed the local business organization of the several states.
A distinction however must be made between subjects which
are commercial and national and those which are local and
social. The history of the times shows conclusively that the
treaty-making power was given to the central government
for commercial and national purposes and for such purposes
only.s The spirit of the day was essentially individualistic
and Calvinistic4 and a surrender to a central government of
the right by treaty or otherwise to interfere with domestic
privacy, to regulate domestic institutions and to force companionship in the social circle whether that of the family,
the school, the township, the village or the state was so
antagonistic to the thought of the time, that we believe that
such a construction of the Constitution was undreamed of
and its negation therefore unnecessary. If, inadeed, immediately after the adoption of the Constitution the doctrine had
been asserted that such an intrusion upon the domestic
privacy of the state or of its localities was justified under the
grant of treaty-making power. it, to use the language of Mr.
Justice Cooley,
"would have been somewhat startling to our people, and would have
been likely to lead thereafter to a more careful scrutiny of the charters
of government framed by them, lest, sometime, by an inadvertent use
of words, they might be found to have conferred upon some agency of
their own, the legal authority to take away their liberties altogether."s

It is argued by Doctor Lewis that the President and Senate
may, by means of the treaty-making power, cede away a
s See

AMvERICAN

LAW REGISTER, Vol. 54, p- 700

3 See Authorities cited in note 6 of Dean Lewis' Article. See also
Curtis' Const. Hist. of U. S., Chapter xxvi.
4 Calvinism was as much a social and political theory as it was a
religious belief. The puritan of the Old and of the New World rarely
got beyond the idea of the small industrial or religious unit. It was
the interference with this unit by the crown which largely led to the
English Revolution.
s Cooley, J. in People v. Hurlbuol, 24 Michigan 97.
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state and that it necessarily follows that they may regulate
its internal policy. The premise however can hardly be
conceded. There are dicta on both sides of the question.'
There are adjudicated cases on neither. There is a precedent,
however, and this is against the proposition. When in 1842,
in order to settle the Northeastern boundary line, it was
found necessary to cede to Great Britain portions of the
territory belonging to Maine and Massachusetts, not only
were particular pains taken to obtain the consent of both of
the states concerned but compensation was made to them
by the Federal government and provided for in one treaty.7
Is there, indeed, any question as to what would havie been
the answer of the framers of the American Constitution to
the question as to whether or not they intended that the
treaty-making power should be so extensive? Grant the power
to cede away Virginia, to cede the Old Dominion, to cede
the battle-fields of Massachusetts! ! ! The illustration of the
cession to Germany of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine
has been given. As a matter of fact Alsace and Lorraine were
conquered and occupied before the treaty was made. It was
a cession after an accomplished fact of conquest and occupation. Alsace and Lorraine were as much in the hands of the
Germans as was Paris itself. But French precedents do not
in any event apply to American or English conditions. In
France the localities are essentially agencies of the central
government. In the development of both Great Britain and
America and in the mastery of the American continent the
principle of home rule, and especially of a social home rule,
has been the corner stone. The French ideal was essentially
nationalistic and bureaucratic. The American and English
ideal was essentially individualistic and Calvinistic. Theirs
was a home rule not necessarily of colonies or states but
rather of the family, of the village, of the hamlet, of the church,
of the township and of the hundred. The right to choose
one's associates was always insisted upon. It was for this
reason that the English civilization outstripped the French
civilization in America and overcame it. The growth in
6 See Cases cited by Dr. Lewis in Notes 4 and 5. See also Thayer
Cases on Const. Law, vol. 1, p. 373, note x, in which Professor Thayer
says: "The treaty making power, as expressed in the Constitution is
in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that
instrument against the action of the government or of its departments
and of those arising from the nature of the government itself-and of
that of the states. It would not be contended that it extends so far
as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the
character of the government or in that of one of the states, or a cession
of any portion of the territory of the latter without its consent."
7 Moore, International Arbitrations, p. 153.
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America was the result of the growth and migration and
pushing forward into the wilderness of small local groups
whose members made their own laws, chose their own associates and set up their own standards of public and private
morality. The West was not conquered, the Indians were
not subjugated by the troops of Great Britain or of the United
States. It was conquered and occupied by the hardy, individualistic, often Calvinistic, pioneer, who without aid,
except that derived from his own axe and his own rifle,
cleared and settled the land, admitted his own associates,
established his own social customs, framed his own government, provided for his own defense and fought for the home
and the social institutions which he himself had -created.
The French on the other hand were always looking to their
central government for their support, their ideals and their
policies. There has indeed been in America a local home
rule, a right of flocking as one chooses, which as an accomplished fact has been more potent than the theory of state
sovereignty itself and has not been dependent upon it. It
has been the home rule of the local unit, of the family, of
the local church, of the village and of the township, and in
the history of Anglo-Saxon and American development no
government has ever been able to ignore it. No law has ever
been strong enough to force the Anglo-Saxon to change his
natural habits or to mate or mingle with those whom he does
not desire.' The Civil War may have destroyed to a large
extent the doctrine of states rights. It did not destroy the
doctrine of inherent social rights.
8 See De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Chapter S, in which
in speaking of New England township government, the author says:
"In this part of the union the impulsion of Political activity was given
in the townships; and it may almost be said that each of them originally formed an independent nation. When the kings of England
asserted their supremacy they were contented to assume the central
power of the state. The townships of New England remained as they
were before; and, although they are now subject to the state, they
were at first scarcely dependent upon it. It is important to remember
that they have not been invested with privileges, but that they seem
on the contrary to have surrendered a portion of their independence
to the state. The townships are only subordinate to the states in
those interests which I shall term social as they are common to all
the citizens. They are independent in all matters that concern themselves, and among the inhabitants of New England I believe that not
a man is to be found who would acknowledge that the state has u"ny
right to interfere in their local interests." In commentingon this
passage, Judge Cooley, in the case of People v. Hurlburl, 24 icl 9
also says: "The historical fact is that local governments universally
in this country, were either simultaneous with or preceded the more
central authority. In Massachusetts, originally a Democracy, the
two may be said to have been at first identical; but when the colony
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The question involved in the Japanese school controversy
is essentially a social question.. You can enforce commercial
rules by law. It is almost impossible to enforce social rules,
except where the conscience and the will of the community
are in favor of the regulation. From the power to admit
aliens to citizenship there does not, as Ductor Lewis -asserts,
necessarily follow the power to regulate the social life of the
people among whom they are allowed to settle. The right of
the community to protect its own morals and to keep its own
blood pure, has, except where the treaty-making power has
been involved (and there are no adjudications on this question)
been universally recognized. Is there any reason for believing that the framers of the American Constitution ever had
anything but commercial considerations in mind when they
granted to the central government the treaty-making power?
Would the people of the several states have consented for a
moment to grant to a new and untried government, of which
the majority of them were jealous and fearful, the power to
interfere with their domestic institutions and domestic
privacy, a power which Great Britain herself has rarely
asserted over her own localities and colonies? There is something which is more important than to be able to perform
one's contracts with foreign nations or to pursue a consistent
policy towards them, and that is the ability to preserve peace
and concord within one's own dominions. It has been this
yielding to local customs and institutions which has alone
kept the British Empire intact, which alone has made the
retention of India possible. When in 1841 a citizen of Great
Britain was being tried for violating the laws of New York
and set up the defense that his act, which was complicity in
the destruction of the steamship Caroline, -was committed in
became a representative government, and new bands pushed out into
the wilderness, they went bearing with them grants of land and authority for the conduct of their local affairs. But in Connecticut the
several settlements originated their own governments, and though
these were doubtless very imperfect and informal, they were suident for the time being, and the central government was later in point
of time." See aiso Roosevelt, Winning of the West.
9 In speaking ot the segregation of the negro, the Supreme Court of
the United States said: "The object of the amendment (14th) was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law. but, in the nature of thinigs, it could not be intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting and even requiring their
separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and
have been generally if not universally recognized a's within the com-.

-tency
of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power."

Opnion in Plessy v. Fcrguson, x6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138, 1140.
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pursuance of his duties as a British subject, the United States
government risked a war with England rather than interfere
with the undoubted jurisdiction of the state.,.
The mere fact that there is in the Constitution no direct
limitation on the treaty-making power of itself means nothing.
It is admitted that there are limitations. It is admitted by
Dean Lewis that there are implied limitations arising out of
the fact that "the Constitution was adopted by a free people
imbued with the importance of individual liberty and firmly
believing in democratic institutions." Is there any exercise
of liberty more sacred to the Anglo-Saxon than the freedom
to choose his own associates and those of his children and to
keep his race pure? Again to use the language of Judge
Cooley:
"The doctrine that within any general grant of legislative power

by the Constitution there can be found authority thus to take from
the people the management of their local concerns and the choice,
directly or indirectly of their lcal officers, if practically asserted
would be somewhat startling to our people, and w'ould be likely to
lead hereafter to a more careful scrutiny of the charters of government framed by them, lest sometime by an inadvertent use of words,
they might be found to have conferred upon some agency of their
own the legal authority to take away ther liberties altogether. If
we look into the severl state constitutions to see what verbal restrictions have heretofore been passed upon legislative authority in this
regard we shall find them very simple. We have taken great pains
to surround the life, liberty and property of the individual -with
guarantees, but we have not as a general thing guarded local government with similar protections. We must assume either an intention
that the legislative control should be constant and absolute, or, on
the other hand, that there are certain fundamental.principles in our
general framework of government which are within the contemplation of the people when they agree upon the written charter, subject
to which certain delegations of authority to the several departments
of government have been made. That this last is the case appears
to me too plain for serious controversy."z,

These remarks, it is true, were made in considering the
question of the right of home rule in the municipality and
in the local community as opposed to the sovereign state.
They are equally applicable, however, in the discussion of the
question as to the existence of local rights and a local police
power in a state or in a locality thereof as opposed to the
power of the central government whether exercised by treaty
or otherwise. The argument of Dean Lewis is rather an
argument or statement of what would be reasonable than of
what actually was the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the understanding of the people who ratified
it, or, indeed, of what is the present construction of that
Moore, International Arbitrations, p. 144t.
2z In People v. Hurlburt, 24 Michigan 97.
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instrument. It might be well to amend the Constitution so
as to give to the central government a treaty-makifig power
as extensive as that contended for, but that is not the
question before us. The question is, what are the constitutional rights of the state of California and of the city of
San Francisco under the Constitution as it now stands?
and the determination of this question should largely depend
upon the intention of the framers of the instrument, if that
intention can be arrived at.
Andrew Alexander Bruce.
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA.

LIENS

FOR

DENURRAGE.-In view of the increasing im-

portance of the question of freight and demurrage charges,
all decisions of the courts on these subjects are noticed
with peculiar interest by shippers and business men. In a
very recent case-Nicolette Co. v. Coal Co., 213 Pa., 379,1906the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, reversing the Superior
Court and the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County,
held that a common carrier, even if he has sustained damage
by reason of the delay, has no common law lien for demurrage
charges; and in strong dicta by Justice Brown it is said
(page 382):

"Hence the consignee of goods shipped by railroad is not bound by
rules and regulations of the company providing for a lien for demurrage, though published, without his or the consignor's assent thereto
when the contract for shipping the goods was made. Even a knowledge of such rules without assent thereto will not affect the shipper
or consignee. * * * The carrier must seek his redress in the ordinary
manner for breach of an implied contract."
The facts of the case were that a lien was claimed by a
carrier of lumber on barges, who detained the lumber until
the plaintiff company should pay demurrage charges, and on
this the lumber company brought replevin and recovered the
lumber. But throughout the entire opinion and in the cases
cited to uphold its decision, the court treats it as if the lien
was a lien claimed by a railroad company for demurrage
charges on cars. So that it may be taken as settled that in
Pennsylvania, unless this case should be reversed, a railroad,
company has no common law or "natural" lien for demurrage
charges against the goods on the goods shipped, and it is in
this aspect that the case will be discussed.
It is maintained that this rule grew up owing to the limitations of the old common law in its power over ships and
to the mere dicta of one case, and the Pennsylvania court,
had it deemed it wise to do so, by pointing this out, could
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have treated the question as a res integra-asubject or point
not yet decided-instead of treating it as a point definitely
settled beyond dispute, as they did. Then had the court considered it as a res integra, the argument for granting the lien is
really stronger than the argument against it, and so, if thc-e
is nothing in the very nature of a lien which prevents its
being granted in this case, it should have been allow'd.
And finally, in some instances, either by statute or common
law decision contrary to the Pennsylvania case, the lien has
been permitted. It is not maintained that in point of law
the decision of the Pennsylvania court is erroneous, but it
is urged that a contrary decision would not have transgressed
any settled rule of law and would have subserved better the
just needs of modem transportation.
Story, in his "Treatise on Equity," says:
"A lien is simply a right to possess and retain property until some
charge attaching to it is paid or discharged."

Since the Pennsylvania case admits that a lien for demurrage could arise by special agreement or special contract of
the parties, we are concerned only with the court's denial
that such lien exists at common law. The court admits that,
by a particular agreement made.on the bill of lading, a lien
for demurrage will be granted to the railroad, but though the
railroad can thus protect itself, the question remains impor-.
tant, for possible mistakes or a combination of circumstances
might cause such agreement not to be specially entered into
each time, and unless so specially entered into, under the
Pennsylvania decision the railroad has no lien for demurrage.
Were there any instances at common law where a lien
analogous to the railroad's lien on freight for demurrage was
allowed? It is perfectly true that there was no lien at common law for demurrage in shipping cases, and yet the common law allowed very broad lien for freight charges. The ship
captain had a lien on any part -of one consignee's goods for
the freight due on all that consignee's shipment.
In Wright v. Snell, 5 B. & Ald., 350, the court intimates
very clearly its opinion, that by notice plainly and widely
published though not specifically agreed to by the shipper,
a special lien on- freight may become a general lien for any
back freight due from the same consignee, provided no injustice was done. There is besides this lien the well known
lien on a passenger's baggage for the fare of that passenger,
as in Wolf v. Summers, 2 Camp., 631, where a railroad was
allowed to hold a passenger's baggage till he paid his fare.
So that, by these two cases it would seem that when necessity
and justice demanded it, the common law courts were not
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irrevocably opposed to the extension of a common carrier's
lien, from a special to a general lien, as in the first case, or
even farther, as in the last case.
Indeed, the Pennsylvania court frankly admits that by
special agreement the carrier can get his lien for demurrage,
whereas formerly even this was somewhat of a doubtful
proposition, as is shown by a case in the reign of George
III.
The truth of the matter is clearly set forth in a case in
the Admiralty Court, viz., The Hyperion's Cargo, 2 Lowell,
93, where the court held that, under Admiralty law a ship
owner had a lien on the cargo for demurrage. The court
*said:
"When the common law of England was modified by the introduction of many rules from the law merchant, the former law had no
process for inforcing this reciprocal privilege of the ship and the goods,
and had succeeded in repressing the only court that had the requisite
mode of action, and was obliged to say that it could not recognize
the maxim even when embodied in an express contract, as it usually
was in English charter parties."
x(Birlcy vs. Gladstofe 3 Maule and Sel. 204) Then charter-parties
were a frequent mercantile arrangement and the court held, that where
in a charter party the ship owners covenanted to receive full cargo to
be delivered at Liverpool and the freighter covenanted to pay so
much per ton for the cargo and so much per diem for demurrage and
the freighter and ship owner mutually bound themselves in the penal
sum of £3,000 for the performance of all the articles of agreement,
the ship owners binding the ship, tackle and appurtenances and the
freighter the goods shipped by him as freight, yet even here there was
no lien for a sum claimed for demurrage on the freight. The Court,
Lord Ellenborough, C. J., giving the opinion, held that tbere was no
lien here because the clause binding the parties in the penal sum of
£3,ooo and claiming to give a lien on the freight to one and on the
ship and tackle to the other "can not be mutually obligatory." The
remedy rests in a suit for breach of covenant and there is no lien;
"for the owner of the ship may detain the goods of the freighter as
security for performance of the covenants, but the freighter can
never detain the ship and so there will be no mutuality of lien between them." Though this is a case of a ship and not of a railroad
it would seem as if the Pennsylvania courts, by allowing a lien if
special arrangements were made, had advanced a little, and are somewhat more liberal in allowing liens than the courts were formerly.
The view point of the Pennsylvania court is more advanced, for a
contract is not void because it is not mutually enforceable, and had
the English court agreed with the present Pennsylvania court the
lack of mutuality in the contract need not have prevented its being
enforced against one party. That the right of lien was not mutual
was an objection only under the facts of this case where the parties
apparently intended to create mutual liens. A lien does not need
mutuality of enforcement and this argument would therefore not be
in point to-day against granting a lien for demurrage, for there is no
mutuality in the lien granted for freight, which is admittedly valid.
and so none need exist in the lien for demurrage.

NOTES.

For this proposition the court here cites the same old English
case of Birley v. Gladstone, cited ante:
"*
law in
create
of the

* * The history of this question in the courts of common
England has been that of a struggle between ship owners to
liens by stipulation, especially liens for demurrage, and that
courts to narrow the stipulations by construction."

So it would seem fair to say that the attitude of the Pennsylvania courts differs from that of the old English courts,
for the old courts disliked these specially created liens, while
the courts to-day have gone at least one step in advance of
them and freely allow the lien if specially agreed upon. It
would seem also that the Admiralty Court in the case just
quoted was of the opinion that the only reason the common
law had not adopted the theory that a ship owner had a lien
on the cargo for demurrage was because they had no courts
where the lien could be enforced properly and for really no
other reason.*
It is, of course, plain that if a common carrier by water
had a common law lien for demurrage it would be a strong
argument for granting the same right to a common carrier
by land, and therefore the subject has been developed thus
fully in order to show that the ship had such a lien in Admiralty courts, and that the lien was not denied to a ship
owner by the common law courts because of any fundamental
objection to it in the law as administered there, Besides
which the Pennsylvania courts have already broken- away
somewhat from the strict and limited rule of the old English
courts, thereby making this present step of a common law
lien for demurrage not impossible had they chosen to advance
again.
If we consider the rule against the lien apart from the
ship cases it would appear to be an outgrowth or corollary
of the following rule, as stated by Hutchinson in his work
on "Carriers," Sec. 478:
"The lien allowed to the carrier by the law extends only to his
charges for the transportation of the goods and does not include

expenses for warehousing them."

2In accord with this sup ition would seem to be the situation in
the Admiralty courts of this country. Here, the Admiralty courts
retain the ability to enforce the lien of the cargo against the ship and
so they allow the lien of the ship owner to exist on the freight for
demurrage and other charges, denied by the common law courts of
England because they could not enforce the lien of the freight shipper
against the ship. In the case of Hawgood v. !,31o Tons of Coaf,21
Fed. Rep. 68z, the court held that a ship owner has a lien upon a
cargo for demurrage enforceable in Admiralty courts even though the
bill of lading contained no demurrage clause and the lien was in thu
case granted by no special agreement at all but by common law.

IJO

NOTES.

For the last part of this important proposition he cites two
cases, one of which only is worthy of careful consideration.
The first case is Lambert v. Robinson, in x Espinasse i19,
and the other is S. S. Virginia v. Kraft, 25 Mo., 76. The
latter case has really nothing to do with the proposition for
which it is cited.s
The other case cited is one of the oldest cases which has a
really important bearing on the lien allowed to a carrier on
land. It has been very frequently cited to sustain propositions similar to Hutchinson's, as will be shown. In the case
of Lambert v. Robinson, i Esp., the facts were as follows:
A consignor of goods met a stage coach on the road and
stopped it to give the driver a parcel to be delivered to the
plaintiff at the next inn. When the coach arrived at the inn
the plaintiff tendered the money due for the-freight charges,
but the driver refused to deliver it up to him unless he paid
2d. extra for bookage and warehouse room; and the plaintiff
sued in trover and recovered the goods. The court held
(Eyre, C. J., giving the opinion):
"The defendant had set up no color of title to warrant him in hold-

ing the goods, as there was no lien given by law in this case. But
even admitting that by law he had a lien, it must be for some legal
demand. That in the present case the demand was an exaction, as
the defendant could not claim a sum where there was no duty performed, in this case there having been no entry on the books nor
warehouse room occupied."

He therefore directed a verdict for the plaintiff. It is submitted that this case does not go as far as Hutchinson would
have it, and considered in the most favorable light, the
most that can be said is that there is dicta to uphold
Hutchinson's rule. The case was to settle the ownership of
2d.; the opinion was a very short one, and what the case
contains for our purpose is only dicta, and not strong dicta
3S. S. Virginia v. Kraft. Here the carrier was suing the consignee
of certain freight for charges paid by the carrier to a shipping agent
at the point where the goods were loaded. These charges were owed
to this shipping agent for traveling expenses and lawyer's fees due
him from the carrier company. The consignee paid the freight charges
but refused to pay any more of the bill which included in addition
all these payments made previously to the shipping agent, for which
the consignee was not responsible. Admittedly the consignee was
the proper owner of the goods and so far as can be gathered from the
report of the case had no knowledge at all of these advances made to
the shipping agent for which the carrier now tried to hold him responsible. The court decided that the carrier company was guilMTy
of gross negligence, and could not even collect in damages from the
defendant. Plainly if they could not collect in damages they could
have no lien and so the case here is not of great weight.

NOTES.
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at that. And yet see how often that case is cited to sustain
the same proposition:
In "Chitty on Carriers," page x76, the -case is cited to
sustain the proposition:
"Where goods are brought to an inn or warehouse, and the consignee
is there ready to receive them, the carrier is bound to deliver them.
and cannot impose upon him a liability for warehouse room or for
booking the parcel."
He does not state that on the facts of that case the carrier
could have had no right at law to sue for these charges because he had not earned them, and naturally he has not a
lien for what he has not earned.
In "Cross on Carriers," page 287, the case is cited under
this statement:
"It must, however, be a detention only for the amount actually
incurred for carriage. Thus where goods are taken by the owner
from the wagon, the carrier or warehouseman has no claim for book.
ing or warehouse room, and there is consequently in such case no
right of lien."
Here the statement is most nearly correct, and yet if the
case had not been read by the person seeing the statement
it might not be understood that, so far as the case decides, it
did not grant a lien because the lien had not been earned, and
was really asked for to sustain a fraudulent charge.
In "Moore on Carriers," page 441, the case is cited to sus-.
tain the proposition,
"where the carrier voluntarily parts with the possession it loses its
lien,"
and though it is hard to see at first how the case on its face
does stand for that, it is entirely aside from the subject at
hand.
In "Jeremy on Carriers," page 78, the -case is cited to
prove the proposition.it really stands for, viz., that a carrier
has no lien on goods for an act which he did not perform.
But this does not support the proposition that if he perform
duties he has not then a lien.
"Jones on Lien," Sec. 281, cites'the case twice to sustain
the two following doctrines:
(i)"A carrier has no lien for charges not connected with the traiisportation of the goods and not within the contemplation of the parties."

(2) The second time Jones cites the Lambert v. Robinson
case is to sustain the proposition in Sec. 281:
"A carrier has no lien for the storage of goods unless there be special
contract allowing him to carhge for storage,"
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and under this he cites only one other case besides Lambert
v. Robinson, the case of Somers v. British Co., in 30 J. L. Q.
B., 229, which is not important.,
This shows how prevalent has become the idea that Lambert v. Robinson really decides the proposition for which it is
so often cited. Compare the statement for which the case is
made authority and correctly in Angell in " T h e Law of Carriers," Sec. 368:
"But cases of this sort depend much on circumstances. * * *
In one case it appears that the detention can only be for the amount
incurred for carriage; as where goods were taken by the owner from
the carrier's wagon it was held that the carrier had no claim for booking and consequently he could set up no lien for delivery."
There are other instances of the misapplication of this case.s
Besides this old case of Lanbert v. Robinson, which is the
fountain head of this rule, the Pennsylvania court cites other
authority. One is "The American Encyclopedia of Law,"
which says there is no lien for demurrage, and cites for the
proposition only two cases not already discussed somewhere
before. The cases are Railroadv. Hunt, iS Lea, 261, which
does not strengthen the position to any extent, 6 and another
case which will be discussed.

The Pennsylvania case then cites "Redfield on Railways,"
page 193, as follows:
"The right of a common carrier to a lien extends to charges connected with the expense of transportation strictly."
4SomerS v. British Co. merely holds that an artifier who in the
exercise of his right of lien detains the chattel upon which he has
expended his labor and material, has no claim against the owner for
taking care of the chattel while so detained.
sIn Crommelin v. N. Y.&' H. R. R. Co., (z Abbott, N. Y. App. 472).
the court in an opinion by Hunt, Ch. J., held that the defendant railroad had no lien on the freight for the demurrage which was admittedly
then due from the consignee for his delay. The situation as it was in
the Superior Court is reported here thus: "The Superior Court on
appeal held for substantially the same reasons as those assigned in
the following opinion that there was no lien; citing besides other cases
Lambert v. Robinson, x Esp. xi 9, and Whittaker on Liens." In the
report of the same case in 1o Bosw. 77, the court cites practically
two authorities in the way of cases, viz.: Birley v. Gadstone-the
reason for which decision has been fully explained-and then the
court, M1owell, J., says: "The only other case (besides the case of
Birley v.Gladstone) I have found bearing directly on this question is
Lambert v. Robinson i Esp. ix9."
6For in this case the railroad itself was in fault and caused the delay during which it then tried to claim demurrage and a lien for demurrage, which of course was not allowed as the demurrage charge
itself was wrong.
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The only case cited to sustain this by Redfield is the case
already mentioned here, viz., The Virginia v. Kraft, 2S Mo.,
76, in which case, as said before, the court refused to allow
a lien in a case where the carrier could not have recovered
in damages anyhow, and so, of course, had no right of lien.
The last case cited by the opinion in the Pennsylvania case
and in the "American Encyclopedia" is an Illinois case
(Chicago & N. W. R. R. v. Jenkins, 103 Ill., 588), which
holds simply on its own authority that no such lien exists.
and is in plain accord with the Pennsylvania decision.
Tracing out as far as possible the origin for the rule as
laid down in Pennsylvania, New York and Illinois, and
through the various cases and text books, the rule seems to
be grounded primarily on two old English cases-Lambert
v. Robinson and Birley v. Gladstone. The courts and text
writers have laid special stress on Lambert v. Robinson, and
more than any single case it seems to have been relied on.
It would seem as though this old case, had the court in 213
Pa. chosen to do so, could have been distinguished very
easily and the fact that the rule was based on dicta could
have been pointed out. Courts of as high authority as the
court which decided Birley v. Gladstone have openly said that
that case was decided in that way because the court had no
method of enforcing the lien. So that again, had the Pennsylvania court decided to depart from this case, it could have
done so without any serious change of the law; and the entire question might therefore have been considered. as a res
integra, instead of which the court apparently treats the
entire subject as one settled beyond every doubt, and pays no
regard to the economic and practical side of the question.
Had the problem been viewed at all from a practical business or economic standpoint there might have been much
said in favor of granting the lien. It seems hard to find any
strong reason why a lien should not be granted for demurrage. The demurrage charges themselves are perfectly regular and legal, except in Nebraska, and they have been found
to be absolutely necessary. Why endanger their existence
and render them so much more cumbersome by forcing the
railroad to sue for the damages at law, as the Pennsylvania
case suggests, when the just and legal payment can so much
easier be obtained by letting the railroad hold the property
till the amount due is paid? Then, too, why is a lien given
for freight? Because the railroad is forced by law to carry
freight. But this first step having been forced by law, the
result is of necessity that the railroad must store the freight
till the consignee has a reasonable time in which to remove
it. There is, it would seem, therefore, but little real distinc-
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tion between freight and demurrage charges, whicl are both
the result of the common carrier's position. It would be liable for damages if it did not store the goods in some proper
way (Porterv. Chicago & R. 1. R. R., 20 Ill., 407), yet it cannot mandamus the consignee to unload; and the railroad
must therefore either go to the expense of building and maintaining a warehouse or lose the use of its cars for that time.
It would appear that the railroad is in such a position that,
being forced by necessity to care for the goods, it should in
justice have a lien on them for demurrage charges.
It is reasonably sure that the ease with which a railroad
having this lien can collect the demurrage will greatly aid
commerce and transportation. The consignee, knowing that
he must pay demurrage as a just penalty for his delay, and
that if he does not pay it he cannot get the goods, will hurry
to remove the goods, or if he cannot avoid some delay, will
pay the demurrage rather than be longer deprived of his
property, and so in the latter case the railroad is not forced
to bring suit. When the necessity and justice of the charge
itself are realized it will be seen that the more readily collectible it is made, the fairer it will be to all concerned and
the better will railroads be able to discharge their duties to
the public.
There is nothing in the very nature of a lien which makes
it unjust or otherwise to give the lien in this case. And Cross,
in his book "On the Law of Lien," page 7 et seq., says in part
that a lien is very analogous to a right of set-off, and he
makes four main distinctions, which do not affect the point
at hand.7
Cross says in part that liens and set-offs are merely means
by which the law avoids circuity of action. They are mere
modes of convenience, which, however, must not be used if
any real injustice is worked. Liens may arise through policy
of the law, by custom of the realm or by agreement, either
express or implied, between the parties. It will be seen how
very simple a lien is. It is practically here nothing but a
set-off. It cannot be sold to some entire outsider. It is not
subject to execution. It is merely the right to hold the goods
till a just charge due on them be paid. No basic objection
to granting the lien here exists. It is a simple and direct
7(x) Set-off is confined more generally to action ex coturactu, while
a lien may frequently be advanced in action of tort; (2) Set-off can
be pleaded to an account less than or equal to the amount sued for,
but a lien exists on security to any amount; (3) Set-off is not pleadable if barred by the Statute of Limitations, but goods may be detained
as a lien notwithstanding that only the remedy by action is barred;
(4) Set-off includes all mutual debts in the same right, but a lien
cannot be maintained after the debt for which it is security is paid.
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means for the collection of a just debt. Formerly there was
a grave objection to this lien because the amount of the
charge was not definite and could only be made definite by
the findings of a jury.s
But this objection of uncertainty has to-day been entirely
removed because the railroads now have as regular charges
for demurrage as they do for freight, and these are published
and known to every shipper and consignee.
Let us consider the arguments against the lien as presented
in the cases denying its existence, aside from their discussion
of the old cases. The two cases which present the strongest
arguments against the lien, aside from all consideration of
authorities, are the Illinois case and the Pennsylvania cases.
The Illinois case (C. & N. R. R. v. Jenkins, ante), in showing
why at maritime law the lien was allowed says:
"But the mode of doing business by the two kinds of carriers is
essentially different. Railroad companies have warehouses in which
to store freights. Owners of vessels have none. Railroads discharge
cargoes carried by them. Carriers by -hip do not, but it is done by
the consignee."

The Pennsylvania court advances two other reasons against
the lien: (i)Demurrage is not of frequent occurrence and is
not anticipated, and (2) the charge is not certain.
The mere statement of these so-called objections shows
their weakness. Why should a railroad be forced to have
warehouses any more than a steamship company? The goods
to-day are usually unloaded by the consignee or his agent.
These are the plain answers to the Illinois case. As to the
Pennsylvania objections, it is surprising to contend that
demurrage is of infrequent occurrence, for it occurs but too
constantly. And the charges are, as stated before, as definite
as the freight rates and as well known to consignors, and
being known to them.
"it is to be presumedAn the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
that the parties contracted with reference to these charges."

Yet these are all the arguments, apart from o14 authorities,
advanced by courts refusing the lien; arguments which are
not to be compared with the arguments on the other side,
sin the old case of Phillips v. Rodie (z5 East 549) which was a7

case of very similar facts to Birley v. Gladstone, ante, and sited in:
that latter case, the court said: "It is impossible in this case without

the intervention of a jury or an arbitrator to settle what is the sum

to be tendered; it would be taking a leap in the dark. When there
is no custom to regulate the proportion and the amount the case must
necessarily rest in damages.1
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had the court but chosen to regard the question as undecided instead of following an old dicta.
The opposite rule-granting the lien for demurrage-does
prevail in at least one jurisdiction by decision and has been
made the law in others by statute. In Colorado Annot. St.
1891-2855, North Dakota Code 6286, and Wyoning Rev.
Sts. 1887-2846, such a lien for demurrage would appear to
exist if any fair interpretation of these statutes be given,
though no cases making any interpretation of this point have
been observed.
Massachusetts held in Miller v. Mansfield, 112 Mass., 260,
directly contrato the Pennsylvania case. A railroad company
had a lien on the freight of the plaintiff for demurrage which
the defendant, the railroad company, had a right to charge
and which the plaintiff knew would be charged.
"Being known to the plaintiff, it is to be presumed, in the absence
.of any evidence to the contrary, that the parties contracted with
reference to it. It enters into and forms part of this contract, and
defendant is entitled to recover the amount fixed by usage, by virtue
of a plaintiff's promise to pay it. This charge is in its essential character a charge for storage. After the arrival of the goods at their
destination the liability of the company as common carriers ceased,
but they became liable to the custody of the goods as warehousemen, and if they were not removed within a reasonable time were
entitled to compensation for which they had a lien as warehousemen.'

There cannot be much doubt as to the correctness of this
Massachusetts view. The grounds on which the lien is based
here is that the railroad becomes a warehouseman when it
holds the consignee's freight longer than a certain time. And
perhaps the strongest argument of all against the present
Pennsylvania decision is that in Shenk v. Phila. Steam Co.,
6o Pa.,

1o9,

Sharswood, J., says:

"The responsibility of the carrier ought, it would seem, to last
either until delivery to the owners or until that of some other party
begins. Transporters of merchandise may be both carriers and warehousemen, and they cease to be the former when they have placed
the goods they have carried in a depot of their own or any other safe
warehouse. Their responsibility as warehousemen is, however, only
for ordinary neglect."

So the Pennsylvania court has imposed upon the railroad all
the duties and liabilities of warehousemen, and yet denies
to them one of the cardinal rights of a warehouseman-the
right to hold the goods till the fair charges for storage be
paid.
It might almost seem as though the Pennsylvania
court had taken a step backward simply to uphold the dicta
of the old case of Lambert v. Robinson and had overruled a

sound and eminently correct decision by a great judge.

But
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the court apparently pays no attention to this anomaly. A
railroad still remains a warehouseman and responsible as
such, and yet it cannot protect itself as an ordinary warehouseman can by holding the goods stored till the storage
charges thereon are paid. This important right is denied to
the railroad, merely because of the dicta in one old case deciding the ownership of twopence.
To sum up in conclusion:
(i) Demurrage was allowed to sustain a lien in the case
of ships by the Admiralty courts and only refused by the
courts of common law because of their inability to enforce it.
(2) The common law courts have been willing to extend
the special lien for freight charges to a general lien, or even
farther, if the circumstances warranted it; and so, since demurrage is a charge made necessary by the same basis as
freight charges, the two are very analogous, and the difference between them is not great enough to allow, the lien in
one case and to deny it in the other.
(3) Especially since the rule denying it to carriers by land
is based primarily on the dicta of one old case, the rule need
not therefore have decided this court.
(4) Then the arguments against the lien, apart from the
decisions themselves, do not seem so strong or convincing
as the arguments for it, especially since there is absolutely
nothing in the nature of a lien itself which makes its existence here impossible. Indeed, every requirement of a lien
seems to be fulfilled here, and its convenience makes it almost
a necessity.
(5) Besides which, the Pennsylvania court having already
held the railroad to be a warehouseman in respect of keeping
the freight, the right of a warehouseman to his lien is such
a cardinal thing that it would seem very unjust to refuse it
to a railroad when acting in this capacity.
Paui Freeman.

